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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA MOTOR RENTALS, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
By its complaint, filed June 11,1970, (R. 240), Plain-
tiff seeks to recover from Defendants the sum of $127,-
603.05, together with interest and attorney's fees which 
Plaintiff then claimed was the balance due and owing 
on seven Mack Cabs and Chassis which had originally 
been sold under contract to Nevada Motor Rentals by 
Plaintiff's assignor, Mack Trucks, Inc., the purchase price 
of which had been guaranteed by W. J. Digby, indi-
vidually. 
The complaint as filed also named Scott Trucking 
and Lee Scott of Boise, Idaho, as other defendants on the 
basis that the seven trucks in question had been sold by 
Case No. 
13603 
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Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. to Scott Trucking under a 
transfer agreement, with Lee Scott inidividually guaran-
teeing on behalf of Scott Trucking. Service of Summons 
on Scott was quashed by Court Order for lack of jurisdic-
tion over Scott. 
Both Defendants, W. J. Digby and Nevada Motor 
Rentals denied that this Court had jurisdiction over them. 
Such issue was previously raised in this court by a mo-
tion to quash the Service of Summons upon said Defen-
dants (R. 271 through 303) which motion was denied by 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson on November 24, 1970, al-
though granted as to Lee Scott dba Scott Trucking. 
Defendants then moved the Court to dismiss for fail-
ure to join an indispensable party (Lee Scott, dba 
Scott Trucking). This motion was denied by Judge 
Aldon J. Anderson on January 6, 1971 (R. 303). There-
after, both Defendants (Nevada Motor Rentals and W. J. 
Digby, Inc.) filed their answer and counterclaim on 
January 22, 1971. 
Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. by its an-
swer admitted allegations of the complaint relating to the 
sale, but denied any liability to plaintiff thereunder, and 
by way of affirmative defense and counterclaim alleged 
plaintiff had negligently failed to dispose of the seven 
trucks and that as a result thereof, said defendant was 
damaged by the amount of any deficiency and would be 
entitled to a judgment on its counterclaim as an offset 
against any deficiency and in an amount no less than any 
deficiency (R. 305 through R. 310). 
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W. J. Digby by his answer and counterclaim made 
similar allegations and then by way of an amended an-
swer and counterclaim asserted that the transactions in 
question were all covered by the Uniform Commercial 
Code then in effect in Arizona, Colorado and Nebraska, 
that no notice of sale was given to Digby, that such sales 
were not made in a reasonably commercial manner as 
required by the code, and that Digby was entitled to a 
judgment on his counterclaim in an amount equal to the 
difference between the amount owed on the contracts by 
Nevada Motor Rentals and the net proceeds received 
upon the ultimate sale of the trucks in 1972 (R. 311 
through R. 315). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the course of getting the case at issue, the ques-
tion of jurisdiction was raised and an interim appeal 
filed with the Supreme Court, at which time the Supreme 
Court declined to hear the issue of jurisdiction over 
Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. and W. J. Digby. 
After extensive discovery, the case was tried on the 
16th day of April, 1973, before the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft, one of the judges of the Third Judicial District 
Court. Following the trial, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and a Judgment Decree were entered in favor 
of the Plaintiff. From this judgment, the Defendant 
appeals (R. 688 through R. 695). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals seeks the follow-
ing relief on appeal. 
1. A determination that the Court had no jurisdic-
tion over Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., or that the Court 
did have jurisdiction over Lee Scott dba Scott Trucking. 
2. The Court having determined that the method 
of disposition of the secured trucks by the Plaintiff, Mack 
Financial, was not made in a commercially reasonable 
manner, no deficiency can be assessed and the case should 
be dismissed. 
3. The Plaintiff gave no notice of sale to the De-
fendants for which reason no deficiency may be charged 
against Defendants and the case should be ordered dis-
missed. 
4. In the event a deficiency judgment is allowed: 
(a) The Defendant should have full credit of 
$16,000 for each 1968 vehicle and $15,000 for the 
1967 vehicle, the price at which each could have been 
sold had the Plaintiff allowed their sale in a timely 
manner, and 
(b) No interest should be allowed the Plaintiff 
on the credits which should have been given at date 
of timely sale. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mack Trucks, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, at 
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all times material hereto owned all of the outstanding 
shares of stock of Mack Financial Corporation which thus 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mack Trucks, Inc. (R. 30). 
The purpose of Mack Financial is to provide financing, 
when desired, to customers purchasing trucks from Mack 
Trucks, Inc. Mack Financial Corporation has no author-
ity or supervisory powers over the activities performed 
by a Mack Truck outlet, and while not a Utah corpora-
tion, is authorized to and does business within the State 
of Utah and operates an office at 2525 South Main, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 9, R. 124, R. 125). 
2. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. is a foreign corpora-
tion whose outstanding stock is entirely owned by de-
fendant W. J. Digby and his wife (R. 77). The business 
consists of renting or leasing trucks, tractors and trailers 
and is conducted out of W. J. Digby's home in Scottsdale, 
Arizona. Its truck equipment is rented principally to 
Digby Truck Line, a corporation owned by James Digby 
and Latisha Carston, son and daughter of W. J. Digby. 
W. J. Digby has not owned stock in Digby Truck Line 
since 1959. Both James Digby and Donald Digby, an-
other son of W. J. Digby, hold the office of Vice President 
in Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. (R. 78, R. 133). 
3. On August 31, 1967, a conditional sales agree-
ment was executed between Mack Trucks, Inc. of Den-
ver, Colorado, as vendor, and Nevada Motor Rentals of 
Omaha, Nebraska, as vendee, whereby it was agreed that 
the vendor sold to said vendee three Mack cabs and 
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chassis in accordance with the terms and conditions 
therein stated, including chassis No. 1974 (Exhibit 1 P) . 
4. On January 23, 1968, a second conditional sales 
agreement was executed between the said parties by 
which Mack Trucks, Inc. sold to Nevada Motor Rentals 
nine new Mack cabs and chassis in accordance with the 
terms and conditions therein stated, including six bear-
ing chassis numbers 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359 and 2360 
(Exhibit 2 P) . 
5. On each of the respective dates indicated above, 
the two conditional sales agreements described in 1 and 
2 were duly assigned by Mack Trucks, Inc. to Mack Fi-
nancial Corporation of Oakland, California and Nevada 
Truck Rentals, Inc. duly signed a vendee's receipt of 
notice of such assignment (Exhibits 1 P, 2 P). 
6. On January 23, 1968, and on February 15, 1968, 
Plaintiff and Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals executed 
extensions of conditional sales agreements relating to the 
agreements described in 1 and 2 by which terms of pay-
ment were adjusted in accordance with the provisions 
thereof, which in effect readjusted the finance charges 
due and owing and increasing the amount of the monthly 
payments due on each of the two conditional sales agree-
ments (Exhibits 3 P, 4 P). None of the exhibits (1 P, 
2 P, 3 P or 4 P) were executed in the State of Utah. 
7. W. J. Digby as an individual signed an undated 
contract of guaranty by which he agreed as guarantor 
to absolutely and unconditionally guarantee the full, 
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prompt and faithful payment of any and all indebtedness 
of Nevada Motor Rentals to Mack Financial Corporation 
and/or Mack Trucks, Inc. and his guaranty applied to 
the conditional sales agreements (Exhibits 1 P, 2 P). 
8. As of January 19, 1970, Nevada Motor Rentals 
was delinquent in its monthly payments due Plaintiff 
under the conditional sales agreements (R. 5). 
9. Don Digby (Vice President of Nevada Motor 
Rentals) talked to Roy Adams about an arrangement to 
transfer the vehicles to Scott Trucking (R. 5). This con-
versation took place in Mack Financial's office and was 
the only contact which Nevada Motor Rentals had in 
the State of Utah (R. 5, R. 35). 
10. Roy Adams called from Salt Lake City to Lee 
Scott of Scott Trucking and confirmed that a transfer 
agreement had been worked out (R. 5). 
11. Seven transfer agreements were executed by 
which it was agreed as to each of the seven vehicles whose 
chassis numbers are set forth in 1 and 2 above that 
Nevada Motor Rentals transferred and assigned to Scott 
Trucking all of?Nevada's right, title and equity in and 
to each of said seven vehicles (R. 5, R. 6). By such trans-
fer agreements, Mack Financial Corporation consented 
to such transfer upon the terms and conditions stated 
in the agreements. Six of the contracts provided for the 
payment to Plaintiff of $18,653.20 on each truck and the 
seventh provided for a payment of $15,683.85 for a total 
of $217,603.05, the amount of which represented the un-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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paid balance remaining due and owing to Plaintiff under 
the conditional sales agreement described in 1 and 2 
above, and the amount which Plaintiff sought to recover 
from Defendants in its complaint (Exhibits 10 P through 
16 P). 
12. Roy Adams (for Mack Financial) flew to Boise 
to have the transfer agreements executed by Lee Scott 
of Scott Trucking and to Denver where they were exe-
cuted by Jim Digby and Walter Klus for Nevada Motor 
Rentals. 
13. The transfer agreements were payable in Salt 
Lake City, Utah (Exhibits 10 P through 16 P). 
14. As to each of said transfer agreements, Lee Scott 
individually signed a contract of guaranty identical in 
terms to that signed by W. J. Digby as mentioned in 
paragraph 7 above. 
15. At the time of the execution of the seven trans-
fer agreements on January 19, 1970, the seven vehicles 
covered thereby were delivered to Scott Trucking and 
taken to Boise, Idaho, from Denver, Colorado, where 
they had been in the possession of Digby Truck Lines 
under lease or rental from Nevada Motor Sales (R. 13). 
16. Following transfer of the vehicles to Scott 
Trucking that Company made one payment on each of 
the trucks, totaling $3,246.09 (Exhibit 17 P and R. 37). 
17. Thereafter, no further payments were made by 
Scott Trucking and beginning on or about February 1, 
1970, and in the ten days thereafter, each of the seven 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vehicles were driven to Denver, Colorado, by Scott Truck-
ing drivers and were taken to the premises of Digby 
Truck Lines and were then driven to the premises of 
Mack Trucks, Inc. where they were left and where they 
remained for approximately the next two years (R. 14, 
R. 18, R. 139). 
18. Plaintiff promptly learned of the return of the 
trucks to Denver by Scott Trucking and of their location 
at Mack Trucks, Inc. in Denver (R. 14, R. 38). 
19. On June 11, 1970, Plaintiff filed its complaint 
in this case (R. 240). 
20. Mack Financial was advised that Nevada Motor 
Rentals was having financial difficulties when the trucks 
were returned (R. 16, R. 33). 
21. Don Digby discussed selling the trucks with 
Roy Adams and Roy Adams was also contacted by Col-
lins of Mack Trucks and by Harold Olsen of Mack Trucks. 
No method of disposing of the trucks was arranged (R. 
16, R. 42). 
22. The trucks were appraised for value by various 
persons at different times as follows: 
(a) 
Value 1967 Value 1968 
Date Model Models-each 
By John C. Roddy, Em-
ployee Mack Trucks 
(Wholesale) 
Exhibit 19 D 4/3/70 $10,500.00 $11,500.00 
Exhibit 20 P 12/10/70 $ 8,500.00 $ 9,800.00 
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(Also stated that wholesale is 20% less than 
retail.) 
(b) 
By Don Digby, Vice 
President, Nevada 
Motor Rentals 
(R. 142) (Retail) ... 
(c) 
John James Alward, 
Truck Sales from J. T. 
Jenkins, Kenworth 
Dealer (Wholesale) 
(R. 172, 173, 174) lor2/70 $15,000.00 $16,000.00 
(Also stated that as rule of thumb 25% off 
for first year, 15% for second year and 10% 
for each year thereafter.) 
Lee Scott (R. 139, 132) 
(Exhibits 10 P through 
16 P) 1/70 $17,683.85 $20,653.20 
(Sales price to Scott.) 
23. The following persons sought to purchase one 
or more of the vehicles during the period that they were 
stored: 
Charles W. Weart, 4/70 Willing to pay $18,000.00 
Employee of W. J. Digby 
Hollis E. Rosch, 9/70 Willing to pay $16,000.00 
Employee of W. J. Digby or $17,000.00 
Russell B. Malcolm, 6/70 Willing to pay $16,000.00 
Employee of Rightway or $17,000.00 
Transportation 
(Robert Digby) 
24. The trucks were ultimately sold by Plaintiff on 
About 
4/10/70 $15,000.00 $16,000.00 
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January 25, 1972 at public auction in Denver, Colorado, 
as follows: 
Purchaser Chassis No. Price 
William Sharp 2358-1968 $ 6,900.00 
Brighton, Colorado 
Wheeler Sales 2356-1968 6,000.00 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
J. K. Merrill & Sons 2358 and 2360 12,900.00 
Pocatello, Idaho (6,450.00 each) 
Interstate Mack 1947-1967 18,900.00 
(6,300.00 each) 
Boise, Idaho 2357-1968 
2359-1968 
$44,700.00 
(Exhibit 17-P) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION 
OVER DEFENDANT NEVADA MOTOR 
RENTALS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFEN-
DANT NEVADA MOTOR RENTAL'S DIS-
MISSAL. 
One of the puzzling features of this case has been 
the selection of the State of Utah as the jurisdiction for 
trial by the Plaintiff. It would seem that the State of 
Utah would be the most inappropriate state in which the 
action could be brought. 
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Lee Scott of Scott Trucking had contact with Mack 
Financial only by telephone, and Mack Financial's agent 
Roy Adams carried the transfer agreements to Boise for 
the signature of Lee Scott (R. 5). W. J. Digby, who 
had signed the continuing guarantee had never had any 
contact within the State of Utah and was subject only 
to a telephone call from Mack Financial to his home in 
Phoenix (R. 7). Nevada Motor Rentals could not be 
found under any stretch of the imagination to be doing 
business in the State of Utah with the exception of one 
visit when Mr. Donald Digby, Vice President of Nevada 
Motor Rentals appeared in Mack Financial office to 
propose the transfer agreements with Scott Trucking (R. 
5). Evidently, Mack Financial did not feel that Donald 
Digby could sign for Nevada Motor Rentals, as Mack 
Financial's agent, Roy Adams, carried the documents to 
Denver for their signature and later acquired a Power 
of Attorney from W. J. Digby authorizing the signature 
of the documents for and on behalf of Nevada Motor 
Rentals (R. 8). 
The only contact with the State of Utah upon which 
Plaintiff can rely for jurisdiction was the conversation of 
Don Digby with Roy Adams of Mack Financial Corpora-
tion in Mack Financial's office in Salt Lake City (R. 5), 
and at this time no actual business was performed. Docu-
ments were later prepared which were signed in Boise by 
Lee Scott and in Denver for Nevada Motor Rentals. 
Those documents designated Salt Lake City as a place 
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for performance. In this respect, they were equally as 
binding on Scott Trucking as on Nevada Motor Rentals. 
The Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals could not be 
characterized as having done business within the State 
of Utah unless the activities of Nevada Motor Rentals 
fall within the limitations of Title 78-27-24, which reads 
as follows: 
78-27-24, Jurisdiction over nonresidents— 
Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.—Any 
p e r s o n , notwithstanding section 16 -10 -102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who in person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, 
and if an individual, his personal representative, 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as 
to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within 
this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods 
in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
state whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of 
any real estate situated in this state; 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, 
property or risk located within this state at the 
time of contracting. 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and 
separate maintenance, the maintenance in this 
state of a matrimonial domicile at the time the 
claim arose or the commission in this state of 
the act giving rise to the claim. 
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In this case the contact between Nevada Motor Ren-
tals and Mack Financial was one of a conversation in 
an office. The question then arises whether this conver-
sation constituted the transaction of business within the 
State. If it was the transaction of business, the Defen-
dant respectfully submits that such a conversation could 
not be the transaction of business. The business actually 
being transacted constituted the signing of the transfer 
agreements which did not take place within the State 
of Utah. 
No case has been found in which a contact as slight 
as that relied on in this case for "transaction of business" 
as in this case. The rule is cited in Hill v. Zale Corpora-
tion, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2nd 332, in which the Court 
states: 
"The question is whether the corporation is 
doing business within the state in a real and sub-
stantial sense." 
Defendant Lee Scott, dba Scott Trucking and Ne-
vada Motor Rentals should be subject to the same rule 
of law. Whatever it is. The dismissal of the action as 
against Lee Scott, dba Scott Trucking was prejudicial 
to Nevada Motor Rentals, and the facts of jurisdiction 
would appear to be the same. 
Title 78-27-26 specifically limits the claims to those 
claims arising out of the acts enumerated in 78-27-24. 
78-27-26. Jurisdiction over nonresidents—Only 
claims arising from enumerated acts may be 
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asserted.—Only claims arising from acts enum-
erated herein may be asserted against a defen-
dant in an action in which jurisdiction over him 
is based upon this act. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT NO DEFICIENCY BE ASSESSED 
WHERE THE SALE OF SECURITY IS 
FOUND TO BE "NOT COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE." 
The Lower Court found that the sale of the trucks 
was not a commercially reasonable disposition. It there-
fore follows: 
1. The court has a choice under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as construed by the Courts of either: 
(a) Denying a deficiency judgment altogether 
and dismissing the action by entering a judgment for 
the Defendant, or 
(b) Presuming that the damages to be awarded 
Defendant under 70A-9-507(l) are equal to the 
amount of the deficiency. 
The majority of courts have taken the view that the 
failure to conduct a commercially reasonable disposition 
deprives the debtor of any deficiency and ends the case. 
The leading cases are: Braswell v. American National 
Bank, 161 S. E. 2d 420 (Ga.); Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt Co,, Inc., Defen-
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dant, 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N. Y. S. 2d 13 (N. Y. 1971); 
Sheets \. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 222 F. 
Supp. 696 (W. Dist. Pa. 1963). 
The viewpoint is supported by the fact that Section 
70A-9-504 creates both the right to a deficiency, in 70A-
9-504(2), and the rules regarding the disposition that is 
a condition precedent to a deficinecy, in 70A-9-504(3). 
There obviously cannot be a deficiency until there has 
been a disposition and if the disposition has not been 
commercially reasonable than a deficiency has not been 
properly established and the right to a deficiency neces-
sarily dissolves. 
The minority view awards damages to the debtor un-
der Section 70A-9-507(l) which are presumed to be equal 
to whatever deficiency could originally have been estab-
lished. This view is evidenced by the Arkansas court in 
Barker v. Horn, 432 S. W. 2d 21 (Ark.), Martin v. Na-
tional Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 398 S. W. 2d 538 
(Ark. 1966). The Code provisions can be read to support 
either viewpoint and the comments do not indicate the 
correct choice. Certainly the majority view of denying 
a deficiency gives full effect to the requirement of com-
mercial reasonableness and its adoption by all courts 
would tend to "shape up" creditors for everyone's benefit. 
Certainly a creditor cannot complain if his exercise of the 
required duty enhances the proceeds of the collateral. 
Perhaps the real distinction between the two provi-
sions can be learned from cases construing similar pro-
visions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Section 
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23 provided that where there is no resale the buyer is 
discharged of all obligation under the contract, similar 
to the election under 70A-9-505(2). Section 24 provided 
that the buyer shall be liable for the contract price only 
after a resale as in Section 70A-9-504(2). Section 25 
provided that the buyer may recover his actual damage 
if the seller fails to comply with the statutory require-
ments as to resale, and in no event less than one-fourth 
of all payments made under the contract with interest, 
as in Section 70A-9-507(l). The Conditional Sales Act, 
as construed, and the Uniform Commercial Code are thus 
parallel in appearing to provide two remedies to the 
debtor — a denial of the deficiency judgment and a right 
to damages which may be equal to the amount of the 
original deficiency. The courts, however, did not have 
the same difficulty in reconciling the two provisions as 
shown by an analysis of two cases decided in the same 
jurisdiction, Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equip-
ment and Construction Company, 102 W. Va. 305, 135 S. 
E. 4 (W. Va. 1926) and Commercial Investment Trust 
v. Browning, 108 W. Va. 585, 152 S. E. 10 (W. Va. 1930). 
Both cases are cited in 49 A. L. R. 2d, the current anno-
tation on rights and duties of parties to conditional sales 
contracts as to resale of repossessed property. Commer-
cial Investment Trust, supra, is cited for the proposition 
that the seller loses any claim to a recovery of the defi-
ciency if he fails to properly carry out the resale under 
Section 24. Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equip-
ment and Construction Company, supra, is cited for the 
proposition that the buyer may recover his actual dam-
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ages under Section 25 if the seller fails to comply with 
the statutory requirements. 
In Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equip-
ment and Construction Company, supra, where 
the defendant was the vendor under a condi-
tional sales agreement and the plaintiff had de-
faulted after having paid $305 of a $600 con-
tract, and where the plaintiff proved that the 
defendant had resold the vehicle for $668, there-
by establishing the amount by which he was 
damaged, it was held that the defendant should 
have accounted to the plaintiff for the price 
obtained by it on resale of the automobile un-
der Section 25 of the Act. There was, of course, 
no requirement to give him the minimum pro-
vided by Section 25 since he had proved his 
actual damages. 
In Commercial Investment Trust v. Browning, 
supra, where the plaintiff was a conditional ven-
dor of a Nash automobile sold for $1,100 and 
where the balance due at the time of reposses-
sion was approximately $200 but the plaintiff's 
improper resale resulted in proceeds of $1, it 
was held that the plaintiff's failure to conduct 
the resale in accordance with the statute pre-
cluded a deficiency judgment. 
The comparison of these cases decided by the same court 
under provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act 
that are substantially the same in intent as the relevant 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code show the 
correct interpretation of both statutes. 
The damage provision of 70A-9-507(l) is to be ap-
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plied when the resale returns more to the secured party 
than the balance that was due him under the secured 
agreement from the debtor. The denial of a deficiency 
judgment is to be applied when the sale is in some way 
irregular and therefore commercially unreasonable and 
the proceeds of the sale are therefore less than the de-
ficiency due from the debtor. This reconciliation justifies 
the majority view that has been taken in the construction 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT NO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT MAY 
BE ASSESSED WHERE NOTICE OF SALE 
IS ABSENT OR DEFICIENT. 
Although the Court seems to have found that the 
sale of the security by Plaintiff was not a "commercially 
reasonable" sale, the same result could have been reached 
for failure to give proper notice of the sale. 
Plaintiff has failed to both plead and prove that it 
sent notice required by 70A-9-504(3): 
"Shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor 
. . ." and in fact the record fails to disclose any attempt 
to do so. Plaintiff contends that published notice (Ex-
hibits 5 P and 6 P) satisfies the statute. On its face it 
does not. 
The burden of pleading and proving compliance with 
the notice requirements of § 70A-9-504 is on the secured 
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party. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 
415 S. W. 2d 347 (Tenn. App. 1966); Foundation Dis-
counts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N. W. 474, 468 P. 2d 875 (1970); 
Skeels v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 
(W. D. Pa. 1963), mod. other grds., 335 F. 2d 846 (3rd 
Cir. 1,969). 
The courts have consistently held that there must 
be strict compliance with the notice requirements in 
§ 70A-9-504(3); substantial compliance is insufficient. 
For example, in Morris Plan Co. of Bettendorf v. John-
son, 271 N. E. 2d 404 (111. App. 1971), it was held that 
a general notice that the collateral would be sold, without 
specifying the time, date or place of the sale, was in-
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 70A-9-504(3), 
even where the secured party had notified the debtor of 
its intention to effect a resale. The same result obtained 
in BrasweU v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App. 
699, 161 S. E. 2d 420 (1968), where the secured party 
notified the debtor that unless he paid off the balance 
due, the collateral would be put up for bid and sold to 
the highest bidder and the debtor would be responsible 
for any deficiency. Similarly, in Charley v. Rico Motor 
Co., 82 N. M. 244, 480 P. 2d 404 (1971) notice which 
stated that the collateral would be sold, but which con-
tained no information as to the time or place of the pro-
posed sale, was deemed insufficient. Accord, Edmondson 
v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 310, 180 S. E. 2d 589 
(1971). See also, Moody v. Nides Finance Co., 115 Ga. 
App. 859, 156 S. E. 2d 310 (1967). 
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Claimant's Failure to Give Notice as Required by 
the Uniform Commercial Code is an absolute Bar Against 
a Deficiency Judgment both Under Applicable Case Law. 
Where a secured party fails to give the notice re-
quired by 70A-9-504(3), he is not entitled to recover 
from the debtor the difference between the amount re-
maining due on the contract and the proceeds of the sale. 
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Switch 
Co., Inc., 323 N. Y. S, 2d 13 (N. Y. Civ. App. 1971). The 
rationale for this rule was well-articulated in Leasco, 
where following repossession of the collateral, solicitation 
of bids, and public sale of the equipment to the highest 
bidder for an amount equal to the then fair market value, 
the secured party sought a deficiency judgment for the 
amount remaining due on the original contract, notwith-
standing its failure to notify the defendant of the time 
after which any private sale or other intended disposition 
was to be made, "as explicitly required by UCC 70A-9-
504(3)" 323 N. Y. S. 2d at 14. The court rejected the 
claim for a deficiency judgment, stating: 
"It surely has meaning that the very section 
(9-504) that affirms the right to a deficiency 
judgment after sale of a repossessed article also 
describes in simple and practical terms the rules 
governing disposition as well as the pertinent 
notice requirements. If a secured creditor's right 
to a deficiency judgment were intended to be 
independent of compliance with those rules, one 
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would surely expect that unusual concept to be 
delineated with clarity. The natural inference 
that the right depends upon compliance is force-
fully underlined by the joining of the two provi-
sions in the one section." Id. at 16. 
Characterizing as "tenuous" plaintiff's contention 
that a secured creditor's right to a deficiency judgment 
under the described circumstances was limited only by 
the debtor's remedies set forth in 70A-9-507, the court 
further reasoned: 
"Preliminarily, it may be noted that 70A-9-
507 makes no direct allusion to the circum-
stances under which a right to a deficiency 
judgment may arise. 
"More significant is the special nature of 
the language used: 'The Debtor or any person 
entitled to notification . . . has a right to recover 
from the secured party any loss caused by failure 
to comply with the provisions of this part.' If 
this were intended to authorize a defense to an 
action for a deficiency judgment, it is hard to 
imagine language less apt to that purpose . . . 
[I]t is unlikely that the experienced authors of 
the UCC intended by the above language to 
provide a limited defense to an action for a de-
ficiency judgment based on a sale that had vio-
lated the simple and flexible statutory proced-
ure. 
"It seems far more probable that this latter 
section has nothing whatever to do with de-
fenses to an action for a deficiency, since it was 
never contemplated that a secured party would 
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recover such a judgment after violating the stat-
utory command as to notice," Id. at 16. 
Beyond this, the court derived some measure of sup-
port for its holding from the position taken by the courts 
with respect to similar provisions in the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act, which as in the UCC did not specifically 
link the right to secure a deficiency judgment with the 
notice provisions but did specifically declare the debtor's 
right to recover damages in the event of a violation of the 
sections regulatting sale and notice of sale: 
"Significantly, the principle became firmly 
established . . . in virtually all states that adopted 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, that the 
right of the conditional vendor to secure a de-
ficiency judgment was dependent upon precise 
compliance with the statutory requirements as 
to notice [citations omitted]." Id. at 15. 
The court added that if the authors of the UCC had de-
sired to overthrow this firmly established and generally 
accepted rule, 
"they surely would have manifested that intent 
in clear and unambiguory language . . . The 
conclusion is inescapable that the prior inter-
pretation continues to be applicable under the 
UCC, and that the failure of this plaintiff to 
follow the quiet modest notice requirements of 
70A-9-504(3) defeats absolutely the claim herein 
asserted." Id. at 15-16. 
Finally the court explained that its conclusion — 
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namely, that the right to a deficiency judgment depends 
upon strict compliance with the statutory requirements 
concerning dispositions of collateral and notice thereof 
— did not impose an onerous burden on a secured credi-
tor. Rather, it merely requires a secured creditor who 
"wishes a deficiency judgment [to] obey the law, the 
relevant provisions of which are now simpler and more 
flexible than before. If he does not obey the law he may 
not secure a deficiency judgment." Id. at 17. 
Having failed to obey the law as to notice of sale, 
Claimant has forfeited any right it may have had to a 
deficiency judgment against the Debtor. For this Court 
to rule otherwise would allow Claimant to escape the 
provisions of the UOC in general, and its notice require-
ments in particular, and thereby "permit a continuation 
of the evil, which the Commercial Code sought to cor-
rect." Skeels v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., supra, 
222 F. Supp. 696 (W. D. Pa. 1963), mod. other grds.9 335 
F. 2d 846 (3rd Oir. 1969). 
The Skeels court added: "[I]t must be held that 
a security holder who sells without notice may not look 
to the debtor for any loss." 122 F. Supp. at 702. 
POINT IV. 
UNDER ANY VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
THE VALUES OF THE VEHICLES SHOULD 
BE DETERMINED TO BE $15,000 FOR THE 
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1967 VEHICLE AND $16,000 FOR THE 1969 
VEHICLES. 
A summary of the testimony with respect to values 
of the vehicles is set out on page .... of the Statement of 
Facts. Here it is sufficient to recite that on the 10th 
day of January 1970, Lee Scott purchased the vehicles at 
$17,683.85 for the 1967 vehicle and $23,653.20 for each 
of the 1968 vehicles. The vehicles were then returned be-
ginning on February 1, which was exactly twenty days 
later. This fact argues strongly that the vehicles had a 
value commensurate with that which was paid by Lee 
Scott on January 10, 1970. Donald Digby gave the ve-
hicles a value of $15,000.00 for the 1967 vehicle and $16,-
000.00 for the 1968 vehicles. He characterized this valu-
ation as one of retail, indicating: 
"Well, I have never had the occasion to total 
wholesale equipment as was testified here yes-
terday by the Mack people. My figure is set on 
a retail level; however, not the high level by any 
means, because I did have the trucks sold in ex-
cess of $18,000.00 for Scott." 
The vehicles were appraised by John James Alward, 
wholesale, at $15,000 for the 1967 vehicle and $16,000 for 
the 1968 vehicles. Alward also stated the formula by 
which he arrived at his valuation and indicated that his 
company was willing to hold their appraisal for six 
months after an appraisal offer was given. 
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More persuasive is the fact that three individuals 
came forward and gave testimony, Charles B. Weart, that 
he was willing to pay $18,000 for one of the vehicles; 
Hollis E. Rosch, in September, 1970, was willing to pay 
$16,000 or $17,000 for one of the vehicles; Russell B. 
Malcolm indicated he was willing to pay $16,000 or $17,-
000 for one of the vehicles. In all cases, giving the bene-
fit of the doubt to taking the least advantageous figure, 
the evidence would indicate the values of $15,000 for the 
1967 vehicle and $16,000 for the 1968 vehicles were not 
unreasonable values. The testimonies of Charles B. 
Weart, Hollis E. Rosch and Russell B. Malcolm stand 
unopposed and unconverted in the record. It is also 
worthy of note that the trial court did not accept the 
low valuation given by John C. Roddy. 
It is respectfully submitted that in the event any 
deficiency is allowed, the basis for the finding of the 
amount that the vehicles should have sold for on June 
30, 1970, should be: $15,000 for the 1967 vehicle and 
$16,000 for the 1968 vehicles. 
Under either theory, (a) that no deficiency be al-
lowed; or (b) that a proper valuation be allowed for each 
of the vehicles (the return at the proper valuation would 
have been $111,000.00) there should and would be no 
deficiency assessed. 
POINT V. 
THE OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES OF $2,-
477.31 WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO 
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THE DELAY IN THE SALE AND IN THE 
EVENT A DEFICIENCY IS ALLOWED, 
THE OUT-OF-POCKET E X P E N S E S 
SHOULD NOT BE REIMBURSED TO THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
While it is conceivable that there could have been 
some slight repairs and reconditioning services on the 
seven trucks delivered to the Mack Truck lot around the 
first of February, 1970, the record is void of any testi-
mony concerning such reconditioning. What testimony 
is in the record concerning the reconditioning clearly in-
dicates that the reconditioning was related to the time 
delay of two years in the determination to sell the ve-
hicles. As such, the out-of-pocket expenses are clearly 
colored with the fact that the sale was not a commer-
cially reasonable sale and should not be allowed. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY CAL-
CULATED THE INTEREST IN SUCH A 
FASHION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS 
FORCED TO PAY INTEREST ON PRINCI-
PAL WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID 
ON JUNE 30, 1970, HAD THE SALE BEEN 
CONDUCTED IN A COMMERCIALLY REA-
SONABLE MANNER. 
The Plaintiff has calculated his judgment as set out 
in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18, in the Findings of Fact: 
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Pay-off as of 
No. Chassis No. April 15.1970 
G181 7778-1 FL773LST 1947 $ 13,518.51 
G181 7778-2 FL773LST 2355 16,025.91 
G181 7778-3 FL773LST 2356 16,025.91 
G181 7778-4 FL773LST 2357 16,025.91 
G181 7778-5 FL773LST 2358 16,025.91 
G181 7778-6 FL773LST 2359 16,025.91 
G181 7778-7 FL773LST 2360 16,025.91 
109,673.97 
Plus 2Y2 months interest to June 30, 1970 at 
10.5% 2,399.11 
TOTAL INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL 
TO 6/30/70 112,073.08 
Less Proceeds of sale 44,700.00 
67,373.08 
Less $40,750 (additional amount which 
vehicles would have sold for on June 
30, 1970 40,750.00 
26,623.08 
Plus out-of-pocket expenses 2,477.31 
29,100.39 
Plus interest on $26,623.08 to June 10, 
1972, at 10.5% 5,590.84 
Plus interest on $29,100.39 from June 10, 
1972, through May 31, 1973 3,055.53 
TOTAL JUDGMENT $ 37,746.76 
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CONCLUSION 
The method by which the Court has entered the 
amount of judgment would require the defendant to pay 
interest on the sums which were not paid as a result of 
the commercially unreasonable delay in sale, and in effect 
would be charging the Defendant interest on the Plain-
tiff's failure to timely credit the account. 
The foregoing is respectfully submitted. 
LORIN N. PACE 
431 South Third East, B-l 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT DIGBY 
217 Luhrs Tower 
Phoenix, Arizona 85003 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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